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1. Introduction 
The division of goods is one of the oldest problems of any kind of commu-
nity. It concerns, inter alia, the separation of objects that cannot be divided into 
smaller parts. This situation occurs in the case of the distribution of parliamen-
tary mandates. Over hundreds of years various methods of determining the 
composition of the units representing a particular community have been devel-
oped. These include the known method of Hamilton and the divisor methods of 
Jefferson, Adams and Webster (Cegiełka et al., 2010a). However, they are 
based on proportional distribution of the use of which is not possible in the case 
of the European Parliament. This results from the large diversity of the Member 
States in terms of the number of citizens, based on which seats are allocated. 
For this reason, the composition of the European Parliament is determined by 
the principle of degressive proportionality (Cegiełka et al., 2010b).  
2. Degressive proportionality in legal acts 
Degressive proportionality, introduced in order to standardize the rules for 
distributing seats in the European Parliament was enshrined in Article 1, Point 
15 of the Treaty of Lisbon: “The European Parliament shall be composed of 
representatives of the Union's citizens. They shall not exceed seven hundred 
and fifty in number, plus the President. Representation of citizens shall be 
degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per 
Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats” 
(The Treaty of Lisbon, 2010).  
This legacy points out the total number of mandates and the minimum and 
maximum number of seats for each country. It does not, however, include the 
characteristics of degressive proportionality. This lack was supplemented in the 
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Report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the European Parlia-
ment Resolution. The rules included in them specify how to apply the principle 
introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. Analysis of the contents of these rules allows 
distinguishing two conditions with which a degressively proportional division 
must comply. According to them, members from countries with a higher popu-
lation represent a greater number of citizens and do not have fewer seats than 
the less populated countries (Cegiełka et al., 2010b).  
Denoting as   – number of countries,    – population of the country and   
– the number of mandates of the country, all the conditions can be saved as 
follows (Cegiełka, 2010):  
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The first of these is contained in the Treaty itself – the total number of 
MPs does not exceed 751, but no country may receive less than 6 and more 
than 96 seats. Others stem from the rules included in additional parliamentary 
documents. The second says that states with smaller populations may not re-
ceive more seats than states with larger populations. The third indicates that  
MEPs from countries with larger populations represent a greater number of 
citizens than MEPs from countries with a lower population.2  
3. Definitions of degressive proportionality 
3.1. “Strong” degressive proportionality 
Differences in the population of the Member States meant that it was de-
cided to determine a “just, comprehensible and lasting system for the distribu-
tion of seats” (Lamassoure, Severin, 2007).  
The result of this work was the introduction of the principle of degressive 
proportionality. The Lisbon Treaty, in which it was written, entered into force 
in December 2009, diversification of the EU countries had been in place since 
its inception. Within several dozen years of the functioning of the European 
Parliament, there were attempts to formulate the method of selecting its compo-
sition. One of them is the algorithm set at the meeting of the Council of Europe 
in 1992. It can be shown in 4 points (Lamassoure, Severin, 2007):  
1) Each state receives 6 seats.  
2) States with a population of 1 to 25 million receive a mandate for every 
500 thousand citizens.  
3) States with a population of 25 do 60 million receive a mandate for every 
million citizens.  
                                                 
2
 For a detailed mathematical analysis of the degressive proportionality, see Florek  (2011). 
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4) States with a population exceeding 60 million receive a mandate for 
every 2 million citizens.  
This pattern was never strictly applied. However, it indicates some sort of 
division – to assign successive mandates to an increasing number of represent-
ed citizens. It turns out that this type of division is always consistent with the 
principle of degressive proportionality.  
Degressively proportional division will, therefore, also be the division that 
meets the following conditions: 
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where             ,             , when             
                 , and        ,        , when    
                      for   {       },      , and 
         . We also define       and      . 
 
Theorem: Each division meeting the conditions           also meets 
conditions        . 
PROOF. Conditions     and    are respectively equal to the conditions   
and  ; therefore, it suffices to show:  
  
  
  
 
    
    
 
  
  
 
    
    
  
 
According to the definition of the quotient 
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lent to one of the following inequalities:  
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If       expressions     ,       from inequalities (1) and (2) are replaced 
by   and the proof is analogous. 
 
For   {       }   {         },      and inequality (1) we 
have:  
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By assumption       , inequality (1) is then equivalent to 
 
  
         
 
    
         
 
  
  
 
    
    
  
 
Which in particular for     implies 
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For the inequality (2) and by definition the quotient 
  
  
 we obtain:  
  
  
 
    
    
 
       
       
 
           
           
  
 
 
Inequality 
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 Therefore, it suffices to show that  
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We have shown that each division that satisfies the conditions 
            also satisfies conditions         . This means that the 
determination of the composition of the European Parliament which consist 
in allocating more seats to Members representing a growing number of 
citizens always generates a degressively proportional division. The con-
struction of division that satisfies the conditions of a “strong” degressive 
proportionality is much more difficult than the determination of the compo-
sition satisfying the conditions enclosed in the European Parliament Resolu-
tion. This problem is exacerbated with the increasing number of Member 
States. With the current number of 27 countries, the distribution already 
poses difficulties that satisfy conditions         . Therefore, research-
ers have proposed modifying the conditions of degressive proportionality. 
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3.2. “Weakened” degressive proportionality 
In February 2011 at the Committee on Constitutional Affairs meeting a 
group of mathematicians led by Professor Geoffrey Grimmett presented a 
proposal to standardize the composition of the European Parliament – the so-
called Cambridge Compromise. The scientists proposed the method 
“base+prop”, where each State receives a certain number of seats (“base”) and 
then the remaining number of seats is divided by one of the classic methods of 
proportional allocation (“prop”). They concluded that the best choice is the 
base equal to five mandates and division of Adams divisor method (assuming 
rounding fractions up to the nearest whole integer) so that each Member re-
ceives a minimum 6 seats as guaranteed in the Treaty of Lisbon. The authors in 
their deliberations went even further. They considered that – apart from the 
introduction of an algorithm developed by them – there also should be a change 
in the definition of degressive proportionality proposed by A. Lamassoure and 
A. Severin in the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the 
composition of the European Parliament from 2007: “[The European Parlia-
ment] considers that the principle of degressive proportionality means that the 
ratio between the population and the number of seats of each Member State 
must vary in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each 
Member from a more populous Member State represents more citizens than 
each Member from a less populous Member State and conversely, but also that 
no less populous Member State has more seats than a more populous Member 
State” (Lamassoure, Severin, 2007).3 
The authors of the Compromise proposed the following changes: “[The 
European Parliament] considers that the principle of degressive proportionality 
means that the ratio between the population and the number of seats of each 
Member State before rounding to whole numbers must vary in relation to 
their respective populations in such a way that each Member from a more 
populous Member State represents more citizens than each Member from a less 
populous Member State and conversely, but also that no less populous Member 
State has more seats than a more populous Member State” (Grimmett, 2011).  
Professor Grimmett also refers to the theorem which states that with this 
definition the division will always be degressively proportional (On the appor-
tionment…). Such a guarantee, however, occurs only in the case of the compo-
sition based on a proven algorithm. It is clear that the algorithm or function that 
assigns the number of seats depending on the population in a degressively 
proportional manner will return a degressively proportional distribution if the 
results are not changed (rounded).4 The “weakness” of the definition, however, 
brought, beyond the facilitation of accounts to the authors, no solution. Mem-
bers declare that “the ideal alternative would be to agree on an undisputed 
mathematical formula of "degressive proportionality" that would ensure a 
solution not only for the present revision but for future enlargements or modifi-
cations due to demographic changes” (Lamassoure, Severin, 2007). So far, 
                                                 
3
 Which was written down in conditions W2 and W3. 
4
 The authors of the various proposals for the function of separating the mandates are well 
aware that it is the question of the  integer number that “spoils” degressive proportionality. 
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however, they have not accepted any of the developed solutions.5 The only way 
of selecting the composition of the European Parliament remains then tedious 
negotiations, as held so far. In this case, MPs shall determine the total number 
of seats; therefore, a modification of the Lamassoure and Severin’s definition 
leads to nowhere. The introduction of changes without a doubt would, however, 
simplify the work of the authors of the various functions and algorithms.  
4. Conclusions 
The European Parliament currently consists of representatives of the citi-
zens of 27 countries, whose populations are characterized by a large dispersion. 
This leads to the need of seeking the methods of allocating the seats which are 
not based on proportional methods. According to the Lisbon Treaty, they 
should, however, fulfill the conditions of degressive proportionality. Scientists 
have so far offered various solutions in line with the assumptions. However, 
MPs have not taken any of them. In addition, it appears that the interpretation 
of degressive proportionality largely depends on the interpreter. A multitude of 
unknowns and the lack of a determined position of MEPs means that the prob-
lem of unification of the procedures for selecting the composition of the Euro-
pean Parliament still remains unsolved.  
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 Members rejected, among others, V. Ramirez-Gonzalez’s  “Parabolic method” and  have 
not made so far the Cambridge Compromise. 
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